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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THOMAS HUTCHISON
The relevant conduct rule in some respects is a bigger bugaboo than it
ought to be. In several respects, the relevant conduct rule is a defendant’s
friend. Over time, the Commission has sought to restrain the breadth with
which the original relevant conduct was interpreted. The relevant conduct rule
encompasses two factors: conduct and temporal limitations. And there are two
different temporal limitations involved. The broader, more expansive one is
“same course of conduct” or “common scheme or plan.” Both of those
concepts have subjective elements to them, and my reading of the cases
suggests that the courts do not always notice the subjective elements.
“Some course of conduct” requires that the conduct be “sufficiently”
connected to the offense of correction to warrant a conclusion that the conduct
is part of an ongoing spree or part of a single episode. “Sufficiently” is
something of a subjective judgment. “Common scheme or plan” requires a
“substantial” connection by a common factor. How “substantial” a connection
is, is clearly a subjective determination. As David Yellen has indicated,1 I
think a good share of the problem with the relevant conduct rule focuses on the
Commission’s choice of factor to use in determining the severity for drug
trafficking—quantity.
That choice is defensible because Congress has based mandatory
minimums on quantity, which is something of a signal to the Commission that
Congress views quantity as a principle determinant of the harm of the crime.
The problem that we have found when we combine the relevant conduct rule
with the use of quantity is that relatively low-culpability defendants—minor
participants in large criminal activities—are punished excessively harshly.
The federal public defenders have proposed a number of changes to limit
the consequences of this in drug cases by advocating a cap on the offense level
applicable to a minor or minimal participant. At one point, a majority of the
Commissioners voting even agreed to that. Unfortunately, the majority of
Commissioners voting was not the majority required by the statute.
Nevertheless, there was interest on the part of the Commission, and the public
defender’s proposal is one way to ameliorate a problem in the most numerous
type of cases in the federal system – drug cases.
The other problem that I see I will call “creeping real offensism.” As
David [Yellen] said, the basic compromise was that the offense with which the
1. Editor’s Note: See Professor Yellen’s comments, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 409, 410 (2000),
in this issue.
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defendant has been convicted will determine which Guideline in Chapter Two
to start with, that is, which offense Guideline to apply. If a defendant is
convicted of drug trafficking, the Guideline used is § 2(d)1.1. If the defendant
is convicted of bank robbery, the Guideline used is § 2(b)3.1. That decision is
made on the basis of the conduct alleged in the charge of which the defendant
has been convicted.
When you get to the offense Guideline, there is a cross reference which
says, “If the offense involved X, go to some other Guideline.” This second
determination is made on the basis of relevant conduct. In essence, every time
there is a cross reference, you have eroded the compromise between real
offense and charge offense that the Commission drew. There have been a lot
of cross references put in offense Guidelines. The Commission’s justification
has been that defendants were plea-bargaining to lesser offenses, and had they
been convicted of the that, the court (by a prepondernace of the evidence) has
found that they engaged in, they would have been punished more.
From the defendant’s standpoint, the situation is ameliorated somewhat
because, if the defendant usually will have pleaded to an offense with a lower
maximum. But, if the real offense element was not in the Guideline, if there
were not a cross reference, the defendant would receive an even lower
sentence, comparable to the sentence of persons who have been convicted of
that offense.

